Git-Credential-Pass
Pass integration for Git, but git-credential-store and libsecret do this.

Feels like a practical riff on HIBP's k‑anonymity model — they add an Argon2 local prehash and a short SHA‑512 prefix to shift the threat model — which is interesting but not revolutionary. The repo already has a spec, threat model and a PowerShell client, yet there's no server reference and some details (their '4 chars = 32‑bit' claim, prefix-collision/load tradeoffs, rate-limiting and caching implications) need clearer operational analysis before you can trust it at scale.
Infosec teams, security engineers, identity engineers, SREs and orgs that audit credentials
The core approach: 1. Hash locally with Argon2 2. Send only first 4 chars of SHA-512 (32-bit prefix) to server 3. Server returns all prefix matches 4. Client verifies locally → server never learns outcome
Current state: Protocol spec + threat model + PowerShell client library. We're pre-funding and actively seeking feedback before building the reference implementation.
Try it: https://iamaxolotl-04.github.io/csp-2026/ Spec: https://github.com/IAmAxolotl-04/csp-2026
We'd love feedback on: - Where does this break in real deployments? - What operational constraints are we missing? - Would you use this in your environment?
Happy to answer questions in the comments.
Pass integration for Git, but git-credential-store and libsecret do this.
Architecture linter for AI code, but Depcheck and Madge already solve this.
Feature-bloated security suite with misleading breach detection claims.
Closes the MCP server discovery gap that shadow-IT has made critical.
Audits AI agent blast radius across AWS/GCP/Azure/k8s before execution—real security gap.
Fact-checking alerts for your feed, but NewsGuard and Ground News exist.