AVP – an agent can't leak a secret it never had
Agents can't leak secrets they never had—placeholder injection at the wire.
Screenshot redaction for AI agents, but no URL to verify implementation.
Developers using AI debugging tools, security-conscious teams
Obscura · CleanShot X redaction · BlurScreen
I built a small open-source tool called Privacy Mask.
It intercepts screenshots locally and automatically redacts sensitive patterns (API keys, phone numbers, IDs, etc.) before screenshots are sent to AI tools or agents like OpenClaw.
The goal is to prevent accidental data leaks when sharing screenshots during debugging or development.
Everything runs locally.
Would love feedback.
Agents can't leak secrets they never had—placeholder injection at the wire.
MITM proxy swaps fake keys for real ones so agents never see credentials.
The two-layer approach — a code plugin for gates/hardening plus a tiny ~1,230-token LLM skill for behavioral rules — is smart and practical. I appreciate that detection runs in bash (no token bloat) and that they mapped concrete checks to OWASP ASI and MITRE frameworks; the tradeoff is obvious: this is highly valuable if you run OpenClaw, but mostly irrelevant outside that ecosystem.
Landing page shows Cloudflare bot check, can't evaluate actual implementation.
Four-pass detection with deterministic fakes beats simple regex redaction tools.
Blocks dangerous AI agent commands like rm -rf before execution in under 2ms.