Agent Vault – A HTTP credential proxy and vault for AI agents
Agents never see credentials — brokered access beats retrieval for prompt injection safety.
Open-source credential gateway with a built-in vault. give your AI agents access to services without exposing keys.
Agents never see real keys, but Vault already does secret injection.
Teams deploying AI agents with API access
HashiCorp Vault · Doppler · Akeyless
OneCLI is an open-source gateway that sits between your AI agents and the services they call. You store your real credentials once in OneCLI's encrypted vault, and give your agents placeholder keys. When an agent makes an HTTP call through the proxy, OneCLI matches the request by host/path, verifies the agent should have access, swaps the placeholder for the real credential, and forwards the request. The agent never touches the actual secret. It just uses CLI or MCP tools as normal.
Try it in one line: docker run --pull always -p 10254:10254 -p 10255:10255 -v onecli-data:/app/data ghcr.io/onecli/onecli
The proxy is written in Rust, the dashboard is Next.js, and secrets are AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest. Everything runs in a single Docker container with an embedded Postgres (PGlite), no external dependencies. Works with any agent framework (OpenClaw, NanoClaw, IronClaw, or anything that can set an HTTPS_PROXY).
We started with what felt most urgent: agents shouldn't be holding raw credentials. The next layer is access policies and audit, defining what each agent can call, logging everything, and requiring human approval before sensitive actions go through.
It's Apache-2.0 licensed. We'd love feedback on the approach, and we're especially curious how people are handling agent auth today.
GitHub: https://github.com/onecli/onecli Site: https://onecli.sh
Agents never see credentials — brokered access beats retrieval for prompt injection safety.
Vault proxy injects credentials at the network layer so agents never touch your keys.
It replaces real API keys with short proxy tokens (e.g. PROXY:openai) and uses an X-Upstream-Host allowlist to ensure containers can only hit approved endpoints — neat and low-friction. Comes as a tiny Rust CLI with init/secret set/start commands and clear SDK examples, so you can bolt it onto OpenClaw or Docker agents without adopting a full secrets vault.
Finally, a way to use MCP tools without hardcoding API keys in every prompt.
The plugin-proxy split is smart: credentials live in a backend (Keychain/1Password/Vault/etc.) and a separate proxy injects auth headers over a UDS so the agent process never handles raw keys. It autosurveys plugin configs and channels to migrate plaintext secrets and even ships a Docker image and CLI for local setups — very practical for anyone already on OpenClaw, though it’s narrowly focused and adds an extra trusted component that deserves an audit.
MITM proxy swaps fake keys for real ones so agents never see credentials.